Contesting #StopIslam: The Dynamics of a Counter-narrative Against Right-wing Populism by Poole, EA et al.
Article
How to Cite: Poole, E, et al. 2019 Contesting #StopIslam: The Dynamics 
of a Counter-narrative Against Right-wing Populism. Open Library of 
 Humanities, 5(1): 5, pp. 1–39. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.406
Published: 18 January 2019
Peer Review:
This article has been peer reviewed through the double-blind process of Open Library of Humanities, 
which is a journal published by the Open Library of Humanities.
Copyright:
© 2019 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the  Creative 
 Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, 
 distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. 
See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Open Access:
Open Library of Humanities is a peer-reviewed open access journal.
Digital Preservation:
The Open Library of Humanities and all its journals are digitally preserved in the CLOCKSS scholarly 
archive service.
Elizabeth Poole, et al. ‘Contesting #StopIslam: The 
Dynamics of a Counter-narrative Against Right-wing 
Populism’ (2019) 5(1): 5 Open Library of Humanities. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.406
ARTICLE
Contesting #StopIslam: The Dynamics of 
a Counter-narrative Against Right-wing 
Populism
Elizabeth Poole, Eva Giraud and Ed de Quincey
Keele University, UK
Corresponding author: Elizabeth Poole (e.a.poole@keele.ac.uk)
This paper sets out quantitative findings from a research project examining 
the dynamics of online counter-narratives against hate speech, focusing on 
#StopIslam, a hashtag that spread racialized hate speech and disinformation 
directed towards Islam and Muslims and which trended on Twitter after 
the March 2016 terror attacks in Brussels. We elucidate the dynamics of 
the counter-narrative through contrasting it with the affordances of the 
original anti-Islamic narrative it was trying to contest. We then explore 
the extent to which each narrative was taken up by the mainstream media. 
Our findings show that actors who disseminated the original hashtag with 
the most frequency were tightly-knit clusters of self-defined conservative 
actors based in the US. The hashtag was also routinely used in relation 
to other pro-Trump, anti-Clinton hashtags in the run-up to the 2016 
presidential election, forming part of a broader, racialized, anti-immigration 
narrative. In contrast, the most widely shared and disseminated messages 
were attempts to challenge the original narrative that were produced by 
a geographically dispersed network of self-identified Muslims and allies. 
The counter-narrative was significant in gaining purchase in the wider media 
ecology associated with this event, due to being reported by mainstream 
media outlets. We ultimately argue for the need for further research that 
combines ‘big data’ approaches with a conceptual focus on the broader 
media ecologies in which counter-narratives emerge and circulate, in order 
to better understand how opposition to hate speech can be sustained in the 
face of the tight-knit right-wing networks that often outlast dissenting 
voices.
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Introduction
On 22 March 2016 the hashtag #StopIslam began to trend on the social media 
platform Twitter, after 32 members of the public were killed and 300 injured in 
terrorist attacks in Brussels for which Islamic State claimed responsibility. Although 
the hashtag had existed before these events, its use was relatively low-key; it was 
tweeted 1,598 times in the 50 hours following the Paris terrorist attacks (Magdy, 
Darwish and Abokodair, 2015) and did not gain visibility in the wider public sphere. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Brussels bombing, however, #StopIslam grew 
to prominence, drawing mainstream media attention after it was used in 412,353 
tweets (including both posts and retweets) in the 24 hours after the attacks, with 
almost 40,000 tweets per hour at its peak.
This use of social media appeared to crystallize a European political context 
wherein overtly anti-Muslim narratives had become entangled with broader concerns 
about immigration, in the wake of the refugee crisis (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016; 
Khiabany, 2016; Wilson and Mavelli, 2016). In trending, moreover, #StopIslam 
resonated with a broader political climate in the Global North, where Islamophobia 
and white supremacism had become increasingly visible (Ouellette and Banet-Weiser, 
2018; Feshami, 2018, this issue); increasingly intertwined (Hafez, 2014; Horsti, 2016); 
and increasingly legitimated in political terms. The rise of xenophobic nationalism, 
for instance, has most notably been evidenced in discourses surrounding key events 
such as: Brexit (Green et al, 2016); the near electoral victory of Austria’s far right 
Freedom Party (Rheindorf and Wodak, 2017); and the election of Donald Trump as 
US president (Kellner, 2016).
Against this backdrop of resurgent right-wing populism, the extensive use of 
the #StopIslam hashtag seems to justify concern that xenophobic sentiment has 
become progressively normalized (e.g. Kelly, 2017; Siapera, 2018). The circulation of 
#StopIslam resonates with concern that anti-immigration rhetoric is not just evident 
on the extreme right, but presented as a legitimate reflection of ‘public mood’ that 
politicians – at all points of the political spectrum – are compelled to respond to 
(Forkert, 2017). The hashtag’s popularity underlines the ways that social media have 
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been particularly implicated in the circulation (Groshek and Koc-Michalska, 2017) 
and even fermentation (Farkas et al, 2017) of far right political discourse. However, a 
closer examination of #StopIslam suggests that it does not fit as neatly into narratives 
about right-wing populism and social media as might be expected. The reason why 
the hashtag trended and was reported on within the mass media was not because it 
was being used to spread hate speech. Instead #StopIslam had been appropriated by 
those seeking to criticize and challenge the hashtag’s original meaning.
Understanding #StopIslam
This paper presents quantitative findings from an inter-disciplinary project between 
media studies, cultural studies and computer science, which contributes to these 
pressing political and theoretical debates surrounding the spread and contestation 
of hate speech on social media. We focus on #StopIslam as an especially visible 
instance of a hashtag campaign in which a counter-narrative emerged. The project 
gathered and analyzed tweets (n = 302, 342) that included the #StopIslam hashtag 
over the 40-day period immediately after the Brussels attacks, in order to explore 
who was involved in circulating the hashtag and identify dominant trends in how it 
was engaged with.1
The original aim of the project was to focus on the dynamics of the counter-
narrative itself, with initial research questions asking what were the dominant 
messages and voices in the discourse, what was the relationship between key actors 
and whether the counter-narrative offered a platform for Muslim self-representation 
or was predominantly engaged with by would-be allies (who tried to speak for 
Muslims in more problematic ways).2 Our findings, however, forced us to shift our 
emphasis and change the types of questions we were asking. Counter-narratives 
are, by definition, relational in always being explicitly articulated in opposition to 
dominant narratives, and in this instance the narratives were so entangled, that it 
 1 We had planned in our funding bid for a month following the attack but the budget allowed for some 
extra days which was useful for observing the trajectory of the hashtag over time.
 2 In the final study we categorized users by religion through self-identification, e.g. we only categorized 
users as Muslim or Christian (the faiths referred to most frequently by users) if they explicitly self-
identified as such in their Twitter profiles (biographies) or posts.
Poole et al: Contesting #StopIslam4
was impossible to focus solely on the features of the oppositional narrative. Instead, 
the presence and on-going influence of right-wing voices necessitated more of a 
focus on the relationships between the original and counter-narrative, in order to 
ask which possibilities for critique and resistance were opened up by these relations 
and which were foreclosed. 
In response to this shift in emphasis our findings are organized into three 
sections. The first provides the context for the original #StopIslam narrative by 
delineating key features of the hashtag campaign as it originally emerged and began 
to trend. The second section elaborates on the dynamics of the counter-narrative 
by contrasting it with the affordances of uses of the hashtag in line with its original 
meaning. We then, finally, reflect on the additional set of relations that existed 
between these Twitter narratives and the mainstream media, in order to more fully 
tease out the political potentials that emerged and those that were undermined 
during the course of these events. 
Our findings initially seem to fit with evidence that shows that online political 
discussion exists largely within ‘echo-chambers’ or assumes ‘trench warfare’ dynamics 
where even when opposing perspectives are brought together they speak past one 
another or clash in ways that entrench pre-existing views (Karlsen et al, 2017). In 
light of this argument it would be easy to dismiss the significance of ongoing uses 
of the hashtag in democratic terms. If the aim of right-wing propaganda is to extend 
and legitimize this agenda in the mainstream, this discourse might seem irrelevant 
if these voices are merely talking to themselves. We argue, however, that uses of 
social media to spread the values of the far right should not be trivialised; beyond 
this particular discursive event it is clear that increased political legitimacy is being 
afforded to these opinions (as represented most visibly in the election of Donald 
Trump).
Despite the counter-narrative achieving more mainstream visibility, our findings 
suggest that such campaigns are difficult to sustain in the face of tight-knit extreme-
right networks. After the initial counter-narrative there has been little evidence of 
contestation of the ongoing use of #StopIslam in relation to more recent attacks 
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in Manchester and London. The dynamics of the #StopIslam hashtag, along with 
others (Evolvi, 2017; Siapera et al, 2018 and the other papers in this special edition), 
demonstrates the strategic and instrumental use of social media by right-wing 
activists, where Twitter is just one component of a more complex media ecology that 
is working to push mainstream political discussion to the right. In this context, it is 
particularly important to understand the dynamics of critical counter-narratives and 
the political possibilities they can (or indeed cannot) offer. 
Literature Review
In addition to drawing together urgent concerns about populism – and its 
contestation – the #StopIslam hashtag resonates with a number of longstanding 
theoretical debates within media and communications studies regarding the 
political potentials and limitations of commercial social media platforms. The 
contestation of #StopIslam, for instance, offers insight into debates surrounding the 
capacity of digital media to offer space and visibility for the self-representation of 
minority groups who are often excluded or misrepresented in the mainstream media 
and events surrounding the hashtag support the formation of counter-publics and 
counter-narratives. The hashtag also elucidates how these issues have become still 
more urgent in light of the flourishing use of social media by right-wing actors with 
links to white supremacist groups. Before turning to our own findings, therefore, it 
is necessary to examine these existing debates.
Visibility and voice
Questions about whether social media can be used to create counter-narratives 
need to be set against the backdrop of long-standing debates regarding the 
misrepresentation and marginalization of particular minority groups within the 
media (Cottle, 2000). The increase in the cultural diversity of nations should be 
seen in the context of a neoliberal, global order, riven by conflicts over struggles 
for hegemony, in which the movement of people is one outcome. Immigration has 
been seized on by populist groups as a scapegoat for increasing feelings of political 
and economic insecurity. As Political Islam was constructed as the new enemy of 
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‘the West’, following a post-Cold war political vacuum, Muslims have become the 
maligned ‘Other’ on which to project contemporary anxieties (Halliday, 1996). There 
is substantial evidence for the resulting demonization of Muslims in ‘Western’ media 
(used with all the caveats around the homogenisation of the West and its media: 
Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013; Ahmed and 
Matthes, 2017). 
Within a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington, 1996) and securitization discourse, 
Muslims have been represented as a cultural and security threat. Largely excluded 
from mainstream media, it has been argued that digital platforms might offer a 
space for self-representation to Muslims in order to contest these hegemonic media 
frames (Brock, 2012; Dawes, 2017). One of the aims of this project was to consider 
whether social media offered Muslims a place for their ‘voices’ to be heard (Couldry, 
2010). Research conducted in the UK, focussing on opposition to the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, for example, has pointed to the potential for particular media platforms 
to gain visibility for Muslim activists (we use this label recognizing the multiple 
identities at play) (Gale and O’Toole,2013; Gillan, Pickerill and Webster, 2008). These 
studies found that digital media allowed Muslims to compete with other social actors 
over definitions of contentious issues and also offered connectivity, although this 
was largely symbolic (Gillan et al, 2008). For many theorists, it is the networking 
potential of digital media that offers marginal voices increased power (Papacharissi, 
2015). However, it has also been emphasized that a further important aspect of voice 
is recognition and being heard (Couldry, 2010).3
In line with these questions of voice, the distinctive role of social media is often 
articulated as its relationship with the mainstream media. For instance, there is a 
strong tradition of work that has offered informative applications of late-Habermasian 
accounts of the public sphere to explore the – often complex and contradictory 
ways – that digital media can facilitate counter-publicity and the formation of 
counter-publics who can contest hegemonic media framings (Downey and Fenton, 
 3 For a fuller discussion of ‘voice’ within networked digital platforms see Siapera et al, 2018 and for a 
specific elaboration on the concerns raised by Couldry, see Feshami (2018), this edition. 
Poole et al: Contesting #StopIslam 7 
2003; de Jong, Shaw and Stammers, 2005). This process is not straightforward and 
frequently involves compromises. For the sake of constructing simple, accessible 
slogans that have broad appeal, for example, activists often create calls to action 
that reduce the complexity of issues or appeal to more general values, rather than 
pushing for structural change (Birks and Downey, 2015). This, along with concern 
that the underlying infrastructure of the internet does not lend itself to egalitarian 
politics in the way that is often assumed, has resulted in public sphere approaches to 
digital media themselves being criticized (Fenton, 2016).
In general, hope for digital media to act as a platform for marginalized voices 
(Kahn and Kellner, 2004, 2005; Hands, 2010) has waned significantly throughout 
the first decade of the 2000s, especially in light of a perceived displacement of 
activist-produced alternative media platforms with commercial social media (Giraud, 
2014). Hashtag campaigns are often seen as the apex of these shifts and are routinely 
characterized as epitomising superficial, fleeting forms of political engagement 
(Dean, 2010), wherein: ‘Collective solidarity is replaced by a politics of visibility that 
relies on hashtags, “likes” and compulsive posting of updates that hinge on self-
presentation as proof of individual activism’ (Freedman, Curran and Fenton, 2016: 
188). Here, in other words, online visibility is framed not as something that can 
support more sustained movement building, but that actively undercuts it.
Although it is important not to celebrate visibility in and of itself, we nonetheless 
argue that social media are not wholly reducible to this mode of politics, but play 
a more complex and messy role within broader communication ecologies (for 
a related argument, see Mercea, Ianelli and Loader, 2016). For instance, despite 
all of their shortcomings, hashtags can offer an affectively ‘sticky’ form of public 
engagement – to use Ahmed’s (2013) turn of phrase – around which publics can 
coalesce (Papacharissi, 2015). In doing so, these media can play an important role 
in creating a collective voice or identity for counter-publics and protest movements 
(Kavada, 2015). 
In recognition of the messy but nonetheless significant role of social media, 
therefore, we take a lead from contemporary research that has sought to overcome 
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polarized debates about whether digital media straight-forwardly support or 
undermine political action, which has drawn instead on lineages from social 
movement studies (such as Cammaerts, Mattoni and McCurdy, 2012; Treré, 2019), 
a field that has always foregrounded the ambivalence of digital media technologies 
for activists whilst still maintaining a sense of their role in political practice (Pickerill, 
2002). This body of work has recognized that social media are not something that can 
be rejected or avoided due to being entangled with the fabric of political life (Giraud, 
2018, 2019), shifting focus instead to how the frictions associated with particular 
platforms are navigated in practice (Ruiz, 2014; Barassi, 2015; Shea et al, 2015). Social 
media, from this perspective, are not something to be valorized but are nonetheless 
understood as having an important political role, as part of broader media ecologies 
where they work alongside and interact with a range of other media: from pamphlets 
and email lists to mainstream media outlets (Treré, 2012; Treré and Mattoni, 2016). 
This understanding of social media’s role offers an informative background for 
grasping the tensions that surround the role of specific platforms, such as Twitter, in 
articulating a collective voice, identity or counter-narrative. 
Counter-publics and Counter-narratives
Debates about the capacity of social media to facilitate counter-narrative formation 
have proven especially significant in the context of race and racism.4 Despite all of the 
criticisms that have been levelled at social media, for instance, Jackson and Foucault 
Welles argue that they nonetheless ‘offer citizens most invisible in mainstream 
politics radical new potentials for identity negotiation, visibility, and influence’ (2015: 
399). Likewise, Rambukanna contends that although the often-complex political 
engagements offered by hashtags do not represent the ideal speech situation that 
characterizes Habermasian notions of the public sphere, they nonetheless offer 
space for ‘publics that do politics in a way that is rough and emergent, flawed and 
messy, and ones in which new forms of collective power are being forged on the fly’ 
 4 We are drawing on this research as we consider Islamophobia to be a complex mixture of racism and 
anti-religious hatred. This constitutes the racialization of religion or ‘cultural racism’ whereby culture 
replaces race as a functional equivalent (Banton, 2004). Prejudice is then aimed at what are perceived 
as (essentialized) cultural/religious aspects of identity.
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(2015: 160). In particular, Rambukanna draws attention to the use of hashtags such 
as #racefail to draw attention to problematic media representations of race, arguing 
that their use has created a highly visible ‘welling up of critical race discourse’ (2015: 
169). Hashtags, however, have most prominently been cited in the literature not as 
something that affords new opportunities to critique existing media content, but as 
a means of drawing attention to what is missing from the mainstream media.
#Ferguson, for instance, has been referred to by a number of thinkers, including 
Rambukanna, as an instance of hashtags being used to raise awareness of racially-
motivated violence and inequality in the US (Brock, 2012; Jackson and Foucault Welles, 
2015; Rambukanna, 2015). #Ferguson rose to prominence in the wake of the police 
shooting of teenager Michael Brown as a means of drawing visibility to his death 
and police violence against African-American populations in the US more broadly. 
Jackson and Foucault Welles (2015) specifically point to the way that #Ferguson not 
only offered a useful rallying point for commentary about police violence, but argue 
that the hashtag’s success was in part due to shaping mainstream media narratives. 
Not only did the issue gain visibility in the mainstream media, frames established 
by #Ferguson set the tone of the narrative. Indeed, ‘early initiators’ in the discourse, 
including ‘African-Americans, women, and young people, including several members 
of Michael Brown’s working-class, [and] African-American community, were 
particularly influential and succeeded in defining the terms of debate despite their 
historical exclusion from the American public sphere’ (Jackson and Foucault Welles, 
2015: 412).
Broadly speaking, therefore, hashtags have been seen as an affectively significant 
component of socio-technical assemblages through which race is enacted online 
(Sharma, 2013) and as holding capacity to support intersectional alliance building 
(Loza, 2014). At the same time, the problematic qualities of social media campaigns 
have been consistently emphasized and argued to encourage paternalistic modes of 
politics that often speak for others. In doing so, they reinscribe racial inequalities, 
rather than provide a platform for diverse voices (Torchin, 2016). Maxfield argues, for 
instance, that hashtags such as #BringBackOurGirls were ultimately appropriated 
by ‘White feminists in the Global North’ in a manner that ‘suggests not simply a 
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reiteration of earlier colonial patterns, but an act of colonialization as it continues in 
the contemporary era’ (2015: 11).5
Appropriation, however, is complex and multifaceted in online contexts; while 
hashtags originating within particular communities are sometimes appropriated 
in ways that reinscribe racial inequalities, the case of hashtags such as #StopIslam 
elucidates how racialized or racist hashtags can themselves be appropriated. Jackson 
and Foucault Wells (2015) describe this process as ‘hijacking’, a term they use with 
reference to the appropriation of the #myNYPD. This hashtag was organized by 
the New York Police Department as a means of soliciting positive photographs and 
stories about people’s experiences with the police. The hashtag was also, however, 
adopted by those critical of policing, who used it in conjunction with images of 
police violence against African-American communities alongside parodic captions. 
This appropriation of hashtags in order to create critical counter-narratives 
offers a helpful lens to approach #StopIslam. As described above, the original 
hashtag speaks to a political climate in which racialized narratives of Islam have 
become routinely articulated with anti-immigration sentiment and in which white 
supremacist narratives have become increasingly visible (Hafez, 2014; Horsti, 2017. 
In the rest of the article we set out and analyze data associated with #StopIslam in 
order to develop further empirical and conceptual understanding of the dynamics 
of counter-narratives on social media platforms, and to better grasp the conditions 
under which narratives against hate speech can emerge and be sustained.
Methodology
Approach
Twitter is a useful object of study through which to approach issues surrounding 
counter-narrative formation, contrasting with social media platforms such as Facebook, 
where people of different political persuasions tend to exist in echo-chambers 
(Bücher, 2012). While (as we go on to elucidate) echo-chamber dynamics exist 
 5 #Bringbackourgirls circulated in 2014 following the kidnapping of 276 Nigerian schoolgirls by Boko 
Haram. The hashtag went viral and was adopted by many high profile personalities including Michelle 
Obama. This visibility put the Nigerian government under pressure to act but the first girls were not 
released until 2016.
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on Twitter to a degree, people without pre-existing connections are brought into 
conversation more frequently. The platform has, correspondingly, been associated 
with the formation of ‘affective’ (Papacharissi, 2015) or ‘ad hoc’ (Bruns and Burgess, 
2011; Dawes, 2017) publics, which are brought together around particular issues and 
often gain a degree of political purchase, although the loose-knit ties that bind such 
publics together mean that any influence is often fleeting. The longstanding use of 
hashtags also means conflicting voices are routinely brought together, which make 
the platform ideal for studying the emergence of counter-narratives. A further reason 
for engaging with Twitter is its relationship to its constituent media ecology, where 
it has a well-defined relationship with the mainstream media (often used as a news 
source in its own right), which – as touched on above – has given activist counter-
narratives opportunity for wider visibility (Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2016).
A substantial proportion of existing research on Twitter can be categorized as 
the study of ‘big data’ or ‘datafication’ as it uses large scale data sets which are then 
analyzed through computational methods. These methods include text analytics 
(e.g. word frequency distributions, pattern recognition, tagging/annotation, and 
machine learning techniques such as sentiment analysis that can categorize tweets 
into coded categories). As well as analyzing the tweets themselves, there are also 
methods for identifying relationships between users such as social network analysis 
via tools such as Gephi.6 Good overviews of tools and techniques for analyzing social 
media data for social science researchers are provided by Batrinca and Treleaven 
(2015) and Ahmed (2017). These techniques are not without their problems, with 
the main criticisms relating to the assumed accuracy, transparency and objectivity in 
the way the results are gathered and presented; interpretation is still an integral part 
of the research design and analysis which results in selective knowledge production 
(boyd and Crawford, 2012; Vis and Voss, 2013). When engaging with large data 
sets, it is, therefore, vital to recognize the ethical guidelines and limitations of data 
visualization techniques as well as our own ideological positions in their design 
(Kennedy, 2011; Kennedy et al, 2016). We locate our research within the tradition 
 6 https://gephi.org/.
Poole et al: Contesting #StopIslam12
of critical data studies which acknowledges the social processes and power relations 
involved in data production, whilst maintaining such approaches can still offer 
valuable insights, especially if combined with other quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Dalton, Taylor and Thatcher, 2016). 
To these ends, we adopted a mixed methods methodology incorporating the 
following approaches: computational analysis, manual quantitative content analysis 
and qualitative content analysis (Cresswell and Clark, 2007). By triangulating our 
methods in this way, the study sought to overcome some of the issues with relying 
solely on computers to gather data. One of the problems with using computational 
methods alone was highlighted by our initial use of sentiment analysis (an approach 
where computers use existing dictionaries to search for positive and negative words 
to establish the tone of particular tweets). Because the original tone of our hashtag, 
#StopIslam, was negative, many of tweets were returned as ‘negative’ because they 
included words such as ‘stupid’ and ‘ignorant’. These tweets, in our interpretation, 
however, should be perceived as ‘positive’ because they criticized the original tweeter 
for their hostile stance. In any event, the majority of tweets were returned as ‘neutral’ 
as they included both positive and negative evaluations (83%). 
We used computational methods to search for frequently used words in the tweets 
and Twitter profiles of users as well as most commonly used related hashtags, most 
shared tweets, most prolific users and network data. But to avoid misinterpretation 
we corroborated these methods with traditional quantitative content analysis, 
manually coding the content of tweets according to pre-determined categories, an 
approach that also enabled us to delve deeper into significant issues exposed by 
our analysis (Sloan and Quan-Haase, 2016).7 For example, not only were we able to 
identify the locations of the users by coding biographies (where computer generated 
data is unreliable) but we were also able to code the tweets into topics to establish 
frameworks of coverage. We drew on further qualitative content analysis to provide a 
more detailed examination of the combination of structure, language, imagery and 
 7 We used one researcher to do this whose coding was corroborated by the project leader for accuracy 
and consistency.
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interactions of individual tweets, an approach that (in line with Deacon et al, 2007) 
proved valuable in establishing the construction of activist narratives and identity. 
Using this triangulated approach ensured that we could capture a comprehensive 
and robust picture of the dynamics within this hashtag as a ‘discursive event’ 
(Rambukanna, 2015). This article is based on the quantitative analysis of the data 
and further qualitative work is forthcoming.
Sample
Twitter, created in 2006, had, in the first quarter of 2018, around 336 million active 
monthly users (Statista, 2018) generating more than 500 million tweets per day 
(Internet Live Stats, 2018). Hashtags operate as a user-driven organisational tool 
for categorizing topics or events so they are easily searchable by others; they also 
tie users into an existing conversation, extending their networks (Dawes, 2017). 
Hashtags therefore structure both content and contributors into more cohesive 
groups, forming temporary communities around specific issues or a set of values 
(Bruns and Burgess, 2011). Acting as both framing and discursive devices, then, they 
enable both the production and circulation of ideologies and identities (Giglietto 
and Lee, 2017; Papacharissi, 2015; Rambukanna, 2015). For this reason, they are 
valuable research topics.
We used Twitter’s enterprise API (Application Programme Interface) platform 
GNIP8 to ensure the full data set was collected, that is all tweets using the hashtag 
#StopIslam from just before the attacks (on 22 March 2016) and for the forty days 
following it (21 March – 29 April 2016). After removing the 551,400 spam tweets 
we received from Twitter, we were left with 66,764 unique tweets and 235,578 
retweets (shared original tweets), 302,342 in total. These unique tweets were 
analyzed both separately and with the retweets in order to identify similar and 
contrasting trends. As well as applying content and descriptive analytics, we also 
undertook a network analysis of those users who had retweeted others and been 
retweeted. This was followed by a manual quantitative analysis of a sample of 
 8 GNIP is a commercial company specializing in the aggregation of social media content.
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the most-shared 5,000 retweets. We used a coding schedule to measure the date 
and time of tweets, location, gender, religion and political and/or institutional 
affiliation of the tweeter, topic of the tweet, and to ascertain whether this was part 
of the dominant narrative (against Muslims) or counter-narrative (that contested 
the original negative narrative). After sorting for deleted accounts, this left us 
with 4,263 tweets. To adhere to ethical guidelines, in the presentation of these 
findings we predominantly include quantitative data that has been processed 
in ways that do not identify individual users and only reproduce tweets that 
were shared by multiple users, which are largely memes or widely-shared slogans 
engaged with by the mainstream media.
The qualitative analysis of 150 most retweeted tweets and their comments 
(sometimes up to 500) is not provided here as it is beyond the scope of this article, 
which focuses instead on establishing the broader trends and patterns that we 
identified.
Findings
Establishing a discourse: #StopIslam and the political right
Before turning to the counter-narrative it is necessary to establish the context of the 
original emergence of the hashtag. The first thing to note from the data is that the 
activity took place mainly in the 24 hours following the attacks, which seems to be 
in line with similar Twitter activity, following the Paris attacks for example (Siapera 
et al, 2018). Figure 1 shows how uses of the hashtag peaked between 4–7pm on 22 
March 2016, the day of the attacks.
Figure 1: Timeline of the hashtag.
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Content analytics
In order to establish the content of the discourse within this hashtag, we undertook 
word analysis, using frequency as a measure of significance. This revealed the 
negativity of the hashtag, as one would expect, given its positioning as #StopIslam. 
The wordclouds (Figures 2 and 3) illustrate the negative content of a sizeable 
number of tweets, with the most frequently occurring words appearing larger. The 
words have been coded in the following way: negative evaluations in red, positive 
in green and descriptive nouns relating to the topic (Islam, Muslims, religion) in 
black.9 It was important to analyze the original tweets and retweets separately to 
 9 We realize labels used in content analytics involves taking a position: our interpretation is that 
‘positive’ equals supportive towards Muslims, ‘negative’ equals anti-Muslim.
Figure 2: Most frequently used words in original tweets.
Islam: n = 11388 Terrorism: n = 3714 Peace: n = 2002 kill: n = 1271.
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identify the content of those most likely to be circulated. For example, it was clear 
through the analysis of retweets that a large number of these were used to reflect 
on what the original tweets were saying (the words that suggest this are marked in 
yellow).
We also conducted an analysis of the most common related hashtags to further 
establish topics and their framing; this also revealed significant actors in the discourse 
(Table 1). What was immediately evident was the intervention or even propagation of 
this hashtag by conservative actors, mostly based in the USA (coded blue in Table 1). 
These findings suggested the hashtag was being leveraged in distinct political ways: 
through its connection to other hashtags (e.g. wakeupamerica, makedclisten) it was 
being used to promote conservative agendas, while the presence of hashtags such 
as #trump2016 or #trumptrain indicated Islamophobic discourse was being used 
more specifically to promote and strengthen the presidential campaign of Donald 
Trump.
Figure 3: Most frequently used words in retweets.
Islam: n = 46738 Terrorism: n = 28367 Peace: n = 8587 kill: n = 4527.
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In Table 1 the Islamophobic hashtags are coded red; hashtags circulated by 
right-wing groups are coded blue (of course many of those coded red are being 
circulated by conservative groups but not exclusively). Hashtags showing mixed 
political sentiment are coded in purple, with only one outrightly positive related 
hashtag coded in green (#stopignorance) and neutral hashtags coded black. 
The appearance of #billwarnerphd shows the centrality of particular figures in 
supporting anti-Muslim discourse, often those who presented themselves as experts 
about religion and geopolitics (whose opinions were used to legitimize negative 
characterizations of Islam, in this case via the website Political Islam, which operates 
as a resource for right-wing activists).
Descriptive analytics
We sought to explore and further confirm these findings through a word analysis of 
the biographies of users (Figures 4 and 5). These biographies are self-defined so it is 
somewhat unsurprising that people use positive evaluations to describe themselves 
Table 1: Most frequently used related hashtags in unique tweets (left hand column) 
and retweets (right hand column).
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and what they enjoy (coded green). The relatively high number of conservatives is 
again evident (coded blue); in unique tweets solely n = 814, all tweets n = 2858, with 
Christians also outnumbering Muslims (coded purple) (unique tweets n = 431:384, 
all tweets n = 1530: 1069). Table 2 reveals the preferences (in likes/loves) of these 
groups. There are more self-identified male actors than female (in unique tweets 
n = 1587: 868, all tweets n = 5783: 4396). However, it should be noted that this 
data only reveals those who explicitly use these descriptive terms with others using 
descriptors such as occupational terms (coded yellow).
To further understand the actors participating in the discourse we explored the 
collocations around these words which confirmed that the most prolific actors were 
politically on the right, even the extreme right (Table 2). Although these numbers 
are small relative to the corpus overall, they represent significant clusters; other 
users appear to be more differentiated. Only two of the top ten actors fall outside the 
category of most frequently posted.
Figure 4: Most frequently used words in biographies of unique tweets. 
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The data is revealing of a particular (performed) political identity of a significant 
‘community’ of tweeters who often identify not only as ‘conservative’ but ‘Christian’ 
and ‘patriotic’.10 By manually coding the biographies and tweets of those shared the 
 10 A qualitative analysis of these accounts revealed the imagery of patriotism and Christianity: American 
Figure 5: Most frequently used words in unique tweets and retweets.
Table 2: Most prominent collocations in all tweets (excluding non-partisan 
statements such as I love my).
Don’t LIKE Islam 473
Pro LIFE Pro 226
Country PRO Israel 198
I LOVE America 173
Conservative PRO Life 148
Don’t LIKE Authoritarian 125
I LOVE God 115
NRA LIFE Member 106
Texan PRO Israel 99
Sweetness LIFE Muslim 96
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most (n = 4263), we were able to gather a more accurate picture of the geographical 
distribution (Figure 6) of tweeters. Again, the US was confirmed as the largest single 
country using the #StopIslam hashtag, followed by the UK and Pakistan. Indeed, 
there were a large number of non-European actors involved in engaging with the 
hashtag which is illustrative of the transnational characteristics of these hashtag 
campaigns.
As well as focusing on who was participating in these anti-Islamic narratives, 
a key question we were concerned with in our research questions was what these 
actors were tweeting. Our content analysis showed that the only country where 
Islamophobic discourse significantly outweighed counter-discourses was the US 
(1,023 anti-Muslim tweets or ‘dominant narrative’ [DN] compared to 297 supporting 
Muslims, the ‘counter-narrative’ [CN]). The only other countries that had marginally 
more anti-Muslim tweets were Canada (28:18), Australia (21:13) and Germany in this 
sample (16:13) but the figures are less significant in proportional terms. Similarly, in 
flags, eagles, bibles and crucifixes.
Figure 6: Geographical distribution of tweeters using the #StopIslam hashtag.
Poole et al: Contesting #StopIslam 21 
this sample, 588 of the self-identified ‘Christians’ tweeted the dominant narrative 
compared to only 24 sharing the counter-narrative (Figure 7); atheists were also 
more likely to tweet the dominant narrative (67:6). The fact that not everyone 
chooses to include their religion in their Twitter biography adds weight to the 
idea that where religion was used as identity marker it was often a component of 
a broader performance of a particular political identity. Whilst it could be argued 
that these findings may be a result of the focus on English language tweets, other 
English-language countries were more likely to circulate counter discourse (the UK, 
for example: 331 CN compared to 105 DN).
Overall, our results mirror the findings of similar studies of Islamophobic and 
racist hashtags, which have demonstrated the strategic and instrumental use of 
Twitter by the far right to mobilize activists and extend the reach of their propaganda 
by connecting to other conservative groups (Dawes, 2017; Evolvi, 2017; Siapera et al, 
2018). However, the prominence of the counter-narrative adds another layer to this 
research, in foregrounding moments when this discourse was contested. 
Figure 7: Religion by position in the narrative: quantitative content analysis.
Total tweets: Dominant narrative – 1948, Counter-narrative – 2247.
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Contesting #StopIslam: The formation of a counter-narrative
The rest of this article focuses on the counter-narrative that emerged in response to 
the hashtag, but in order to fully grasp its affordances it is still helpful to contrast 
it with the original narrative itself, both because it is difficult to disentangle from 
the original and because a comparative approach is useful in making sense of its 
dynamics. While there is clearly a clustering of right-wing groups circulating the 
dominant narrative, an analysis of the most shared tweets demonstrates a different 
pattern. The most retweeted tweets appear to be defending Muslims, establishing 
a counter-narrative against #StopIslam. Table 3 shows that in the top shared 
Table 3: Most shared tweets (in their original form).
1. y’all are tweeting #StopIslam when … (see image below) 6,643
2. Why is #StopIslam trending? It should be #StopISIS 3,791
3.  I said this earlier today, but seeing this ridiculous hash tag made me want to 
re-share. #StopIslam open your eyes. (includes meme negating link between 
Muslims and terrorism)
3,420
4.  #StopIslam? Eyh, the muslim boys next door bring me tom yam whenever I’m 
sick. Why would I stop kind souls like them?
2,500
5.  Educate Yourself. #StopIslam is pathetic! Terrorism has no place in Islam. 
(includes meme with a quote from the Quran forbidding murder)
1,989
6.  Are white lives more precious than Muslim/Arab lives. Terrorism has no 
religion so focus on issue not #StopIslam (includes a meme on the hypocrisy 
of showing sympathy with only white victims of terrorism)
1,769
7. Why is #StopIslam trending? It should be #StopISIS 1,755
8.  I wish #stopisis was trending instead of #StopIslam. The act of ignorant and 
bad people doesn’t mean we should blame all religion.
1,603
9.  #StopIslam is pure Islamophobia. We know Islam is a religion of peace 
and terror has no religion. (includes visual data that suggests Islamism is 
responsible for most acts of terrorism)
1,500
10.  “If you didn’t study Islam, Please don’t say anything about Islam” Islam doesn’t 
teach terrorism. #StopIslam (includes a photograph of the source of the quote)
1,463
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tweets, only one (number 9) carried the original meaning of the hashtag (only 
identifiable through a meme, which showed the wording was intended sarcastically, 
see Figure 8). The top shared tweet, defending11Islam, was retweeted 6,643 times 
whilst the top tweet attacking Islam was shared 1,500 times; the next most shared 
dominant narrative was only retweeted 761 times. 
A key characteristic of the counter-narrative was the use of infographics, URLs 
and memes to undermine the dominant narrative. Our manual content analysis 
allowed us to further analyze the characteristics of these tweets. Geographically, 
counter-narratives were shared mostly by tweeters in the UK (74% of the UK sample) 
and the MENA regions (86%). 95% of tweets from Turkey shared the counter-
narrative and 97% from Pakistan.12 There was no significant difference in the gender 
of those sharing dominant or counter-narratives. The counter-narrative was more 
 11 Tweets have been removed to protect anonymity.
 12 We corroborated geographical location through the collection of location data using descriptive 
analytics. However, this data can be unreliable as it may only be an indication of where someone is 
located at a particular moment in time (they may, for example, be on holiday) rather than where they 
are from. The manual coding supported the findings of the computational analysis.
Figure 8: Examples of memes attached to tweets.11
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likely to be shared by Muslims (99%). We further coded the top tweets (including 
retweets) into topics and then themes (Table 4).13 This analysis shows the framing of 
both narratives was extremely narrow as 95% of tweets could be categorized within 
these themes. The data also demonstrates how the right-wing actors have politicized 
this hashtag, tying it into anti-left agendas, whilst the counter-narrative focuses on 
defending Islam and Muslims.
Whilst Table 4 shows that the most popular individual topic of tweets included 
arguments that negated the relationship between Islam and terrorism, when topics 
are combined there is a fairly even split between positive (46.4%) and negative 
 13 In order to develop the content analysis we familiarized ourselves with the first 300 tweets to ensure 
we had an exhaustive predetermined list of topics for manual coding. As there were many topics that 
contained a similar theme (or meaning), and too many topics can result in meaningless data due to 
the tiny percentages generated, initial categories were organized into broader themes before coding. 
For example, the theme Negating the relationship between Islam and terrorism included the following 
topics: it should be Stop ISIS; Islam is not terrorist; terrorism is not religious; hypocrisy over the 
labelling of terrorists; terrorists are in the minority; attacking the ignorance of those circulating the #; 
and fearmongering about Islam. Anti-Muslim posts were coded as dominant (in line with the original 
hashtag) and those supporting Muslims as Counter-narratives; we also had a mixed category, which 
often included tweets reporting on the existence of the hashtag rather than taking a stance.
Table 4: Themes of tweets and retweets.
Topic Number %
Negates the relationship between Islam and Terrorism 1,419 33.3
Islamification/spread of Islam 967 22.7
Islam as a negative force 704 16.5
Islam as a positive force 397 9.3
Anti-left agendas 209 4.9
Muslims as victims/discrimination/Islamophobia 141 3.3
Reflecting on the # trending 127 3.0
Anti-far right discourse 22 0.5
Other 55 1.3
Total 4,041 94.8
Other identified themes 222 5.2
Total Sample 4,263 100
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(44.1%) discourses about Islam. This could be because there was less diversity in 
the counter-narratives being shared. There was also a difference in information flow 
(Figure 9). As an existing hashtag (prior to this event), the dominant narrative had 
more longevity, while the counter-narrative was predominantly shared in the 24 
hours after the attacks. The qualitative analysis demonstrates the amount of flak 
vociferously generated by the right to close down the opposing discourse. In terms 
of longevity, given that the dynamics of #StopIslam mirrors similar events such as 
the counter response to #JesuisCharlie following the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack 
in 2015 (Dawes, 2017), this suggests that this could be the natural life of a counter-
movement on Twitter.
The decline of the counter-narrative is significant in light of the ongoing use of the 
hashtag following more recent events, such as the 2017 terror attacks in Manchester 
and London. In these contexts, it has reverted back to its original function (to spread 
Islamophobic discourse and extend right-wing agendas). However, even though the 
counter-narrative was short-lived, the data does demonstrate the potential of digital 
media platforms to galvanize and create collectivities which can have discursive 
power. This is sharply illustrated by the selection and reporting of the dynamics of 
this hashtag in the mainstream media.
Figure 9: Timeline of dominant and counter-narrative tweets.
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Reporting #StopIslam: A successful ‘hijacking’?
This hashtag first became visible to us due to its reporting in mainstream media, 
including CNN, Daily Express, Daily Mirror, Daily Star, Russia Today and The 
Washington Post among others. To examine the mainstream media uptake further, 
we analyzed the affiliations of the accounts of the top 5,000 tweets and also 
qualitatively analyzed the 100 users with the most followers (see Methodology). 
Most of these top 5,000 tweets were disseminated by individual users (78.8%), with 
a slightly higher proportion of accounts tweeting the counter-narrative (57.3% 
compared to 41.3% the dominant narrative). 9.6% tweets were circulated by what 
could be defined as ‘alt-right’ groups; this was the only affiliation of top tweeters 
that was more likely to support the dominant narrative (99.7%). Media institutions 
and celebrities (3.8%), in contrast, were more likely to report on the counter-
narrative (67.4%). 
If we look at the top 100 accounts in our dataset who have the most followers, 
22 of these were media (news) organisations including Al Jazeera, CNN, Nigeria 
Newsdesk, The Independent and The Washington Post. As 64% of these institutions 
reported on the counter-narrative, this adds further weight to the argument that 
the hashtag was successfully appropriated by a counter-movement in order to gain 
visibility for anti-racist, inclusionary discourse. Other users with large numbers of 
followers were also more likely to support the counter-narrative. Only two of the 
18 unverified organisations (including far right news site Breitbart),14 one of the 43 
highly differentiated individual users and three of the 17 verified users (including 
far right anti-Muslim Dutch politician Geert Wilders) perpetuated the dominant 
narrative.15 Both the most shared tweets and the tweets disseminated by accounts 
with the most users were more likely to support or reflect on the counter-narrative. 
The success of this counter-narrative echoes the claims of a number of academics 
that particular uses of Twitter can enable grassroots collectives to change a story that 
 14 Breitbart since became a verified account (in December 2016).
 15 Verification is the process that Twitter uses to authenticate accounts to allow users to assess the 
trustworthiness of users, gaining more attention in the wake of their strategy to combat ‘fake news’.
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seeks to spread hatred into something much more positive (Jackson and Foucault 
Welles, 2015, 2016; Dawes, 2017). 
Networks and echo-chambers: Evidence of ‘connected 
communities’
The success of the counter-narrative seemed to suggest that, because of the particular 
characteristics of Twitter, people do often stray out of their ‘echo-chambers’ to 
interact with others and challenge views they dispute, and that the use of hashtags 
and retweeting provides this functionality. However, we ultimately found that the 
evidence for segmentation is still strong. Figure 10, for example, demonstrates the 
polarized collectivities that coalesced around #StopIslam. 
The network diagram shows the connections between users in a retweet 
network. It is composed of 1,944 users who have had their own tweets retweeted (to 
reduce the network to ‘key’ users), with the size of each circle (representing a user 
in the network) related to the number of times they have been retweeted. The lines 
between each user link the user being retweeted and the user who is retweeting 
them. Through a closer analysis of the users (made anonymous here) it was possible 
to establish that those on the left represent the voices attacking Islam whilst those 
on the right are engaging in the counter-narrative. The left cluster reveals the large 
nodes of prolific and authoritative users of the hashtag and their influential networks. 
Figure 10: Retweet network.
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It also demonstrates the tightly-bound networks of the (political) right compared to 
the more diffuse supportive users. It is this structure that allows right-wing ‘serial 
transnational activists’ (Mercea and Bastos, 2016) to be so effective in spreading 
their ideologies. These contrasting dynamics of the ‘echo-chambers’ we identified 
may, through density or dispersion, block out or shut down the further circulation 
of counter-narratives, as evident in the longevity of conservative voices (Figure 8). 
However, the affordances of Twitter, based on its feature of retweeting, can create 
room for the emergence of issue-based counter publics in specific circumstances 
and moments. Whilst distributed by individuals, they produce a coherent message 
around #StopIslam, so become simultaneously fragmented and collectivized (Siapera 
et al, 2018). 
The challenge offered by counter-narratives can be quickly subsumed, therefore, 
due to the ad-hoc nature of the communities that cohere around them, in contrast 
with right-wing online communities that have more established information-
sharing patterns. What appears to be different about our study from existing 
research is that it shows how the mainstream media, usually part of the dominant 
narrative regarding the representation of Muslims, briefly featured a grassroots 
counter-narrative, offering a glimpse of future possibilities for progressive politics. 
Twitter alone may not be able to challenge established power structures, however, 
by adopting an approach which recognizes its role as a part of a system of ‘hybrid 
media’ (Chadwick, 2013; Treré, 2019), activist groups may be able to propel their 
voices into the public sphere. At the same time, the activities of right-wing groups 
here show how user-led political participation needs to be strategically supported to 
have a greater impact.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this article we traced the dynamics of the Islamophobic Twitter hashtag #StopIslam 
and found that at the point when the hashtag was shared the most frequently, 
it was not primarily being used to circulate anti-Islamic sentiment but had been 
appropriated by users (including both Muslim self-advocates and would-be allies) 
seeking to contest hate speech. A ‘discursive event’ (Rambukkana, 2015) that was 
originally an attack on Muslims, therefore, had been transformed into a defence. 
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Previous studies, examining racist and exclusionary discourse on Twitter, 
have similarly demonstrated the centrality of the US right in contributing to the 
virality of this discourse (Magdy et al, 2015). Densely connected and persistently 
used, #StopIslam was one of a range of interrelated hashtags associated with right-
wing populist sentiment that were used by various semi-organized political groups 
campaigning for Donald Trump at the start of the US election period. We do not wish 
to homogenize the range of actors involved in propagating these discourses (as they 
seem to range from individuals who support Trump to more organized extreme-right 
news outlets), yet at the same time, and as Evolvi (2017) argues, the affordances of 
Twitter do appear to enable disparate right-wing voices to come together in ways 
that give the sense of a collective identity, an identity often established in explicitly 
antagonistic relation to minority groups in particular. For Siapera et al (2018) the 
capturing of long-standing hashtags to this effect is an example of how information 
flow on Twitter has become instrumentalized and manipulated strategically for 
political purposes. These ‘strategic publics’ are driven by an identity politics provoked 
by an affective, and often shared, response to a specific issue (Dawes, 2017).
Due to the random and fluid ways in which they develop, collectivities that 
emerge on Twitter have also been conceptualized as ‘ad-hoc’ or ‘networked publics’, 
or ‘connected communities’ (Bruns and Burgess, 2011; Dawes, 2017). The focus on 
a particular cause and the speed at which these communities can form allows them 
to be inclusive and can, at times, change the direction of a dominant discourse 
through the political participation by or on behalf of excluded groups (Brock, 2012; 
Dawes, 2017; Papacharissi, 2015; Rambukanna, 2015; Sharma, 2013; Siapera et al, 
2018). Dawes’s (2017) analysis of the counter response to #JesuisCharlie – itself 
framed as an issue of freedom of speech after the attack on the French satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo – argues that the alternative hashtag #JeNeSuisPasCharlie 
demonstrates the heterogeneity of voices that are ‘connected’ by a shared reaction to 
the dominant frame. The emergence of such communities can temporarily subvert 
such frames, briefly allowing marginalized voices centrality. The loose-knit dynamics 
of these communities, however, can impact on how purposeful they are, hence the 
use of ‘connected’ rather than ‘collective’ to describe them (Dawes, 2017). Siapera 
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et al. (2018), moreover, argue that the power of these counter publics remains 
‘liminal’ as opposed to the structural, more permanent power of established groups 
and institutions.
Our research builds upon these existing findings, but in this case the prominence 
of the counter-narrative also offers an alternative frame for a number of mainstream 
media outlets – including CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera – in their portrayal of public 
sentiment after the attacks. The contestation of #StopIslam, in other words, does 
appear to be a productive instance of what Jackson and Foucault-Welles (2015) term 
online ‘hijacking’, wherein the original meaning of an online narrative is transformed 
through counter-public intervention in order to re-frame how an event is represented 
in the mainstream media. Whilst it could be argued that the power of the counter-
narrative was often depoliticized in mainstream media in the way #StopIslam was 
reported (with articles often reflecting on the counter-narrative trending rather 
than its content) this momentary inclusion did offer some recognition to usually 
marginalized voices.
These findings suggest that more research is needed into how the media works 
as an ecological system, using methods that combine big data with a more qualitative 
approach to digital activism that could contribute to establishing the digital media 
practices that give specific narratives visibility and traction. As social media becomes 
more central to political participation (Kriess and McGregor, 2017) but continues to 
favour dominant and populist groups through its political economy (Groshek and 
Koc-Michalska, 2017) research needs to adopt a longitudinal approach to reflect on 
longer terms patterns and shifts in the dynamics of communication online.
The circulation and contestation of #StopIslam thus speaks to the present 
political context, in drawing together concerns about the rise of right-wing 
populism, white supremacy and normalization of nationalistic and xenophobic 
sentiment targeted at particular communities. In particular, the hashtag ‘campaign’ 
seems to bear out concern about the imbrication of social media in these discourses 
(Evolvi, 2017). At the same time, responses to #StopIslam also promise a glimmer of 
hope regarding the capacity of social media platforms to also be used to challenge 
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hate speech, even if such uses are fraught with compromises and difficulties. The 
political significance of digital media has often been overstated (Freedman et al, 
2016) and in analyzing the dynamics of #StopIslam we are not seeking to make 
broad claims about social media, but to develop a clearer sense of how counter-
narratives against hate speech can emerge, circulate, and gain wider visibility. While 
the model of participation Twitter offers is clearly limited, this study demonstrates 
its potential for a more distributed production of discourses and the capacity 
for connected communities to participate in protest when an issue cuts across a 
broad range of socio-political identities. Although this type of counter-narrative 
formation should not be valorized in and of itself, therefore, we nonetheless argue 
that it is still an important component of contemporary media ecologies that needs 
to be better understood. In light of seemingly successful uses of social media by 
right-wing communities, including white supremacist groups, in extending their 
discourses outwards, it is particularly important not to dismiss these opportunities 
for contestation, however fleeting.
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